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ABSTRACT 
 
Learning about categories of things in the world (e.g., that lions have manes) and learning about 
the individuals around us (e.g., that the new neighbor is friendly) are both crucial cognitive tasks 
whose output enables people to behave adaptively in many novel circumstances. Aside from 
their importance to our lives, however, these two tasks seem to have little in common: Reasoning 
about the features of categories appears to rely on a set of computations that is entirely distinct 
from those involved in reasoning about the traits of individuals. Consistent with this impression, 
these judgments have been studied in near-complete isolation. Here, however, we propose that 
inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals are in fact computed by the 
same cognitive mechanism. To test this hypothesis, we investigated whether kind-feature and 
individual-trait inferences share two distinctive signatures: namely, whether they are both 
facilitated by features/behaviors that are (1) threatening or (2) unique. Five experiments provided 
evidence for this prediction. The results also suggested that these signatures were not shared by 
other types of inferences. That is, the information that facilitated participants’ kind-feature and 
individual-trait inferences did not similarly facilitate quantified inferences concerning whether 
all/some members of a kind display a feature and whether an individual always/sometimes 
performs a behavior. By suggesting that inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of 
individuals share a cognitive source, these studies open possibilities for dialogue between the 
independent research traditions that have investigated these important aspects of human thought. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Humans routinely use limited first-hand evidence to construct broader knowledge about 
their natural and social worlds. In fact, the ability to make such inferential leaps is a cornerstone 
of our species’ success in predicting and controlling its environment. Two types of these 
specific-to-general inferences seem to play particularly prominent roles in our mental lives: First, 
we draw inferences about the features of kinds of things in the world on the basis of evidence 
about specific members of those kinds. After learning, for instance, that one’s cat likes to sleep 
in cardboard boxes, one might conclude that cats, as a kind, like to do the same. Second, we 
draw inferences about the dispositions of the individuals around us by observing their behavior 
in particular situations. For instance, after seeing a colleague donate money to a charity, one 
might conclude that she is generous. Our goal in the present research was to investigate the 
mechanisms that underlie these inferences. Specifically, we ask: What is the relationship 
between the mechanism that enables people to learn about the features of kinds and the 
mechanism that enables them to learn about the dispositions of individuals?  
Several considerations suggest that the two mechanisms have little, if anything, in 
common. Intuitively, for example, kind-feature and individual-trait inferences appear to be 
entirely different sorts of judgments. The former involves generalizing across individuals to infer 
a feature of a broad category, while the latter involves making an inference from an altogether 
different sort of entity (namely, a situation or time slice) to an altogether different sort of target 
(namely, a disposition of a single individual).1 Consistent with these surface differences, kind-
feature and individual-trait inferences have been the focus of largely separate research traditions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We use the terms trait and disposition interchangeably to refer to a stable quality or characteristic of an individual 
that makes it likely for that individual to behave in certain ways. 
 	   2	  
with minimal overlap in terms of the mechanisms proposed and investigated. Inductive 
inferences about the features of kinds have been a longstanding focus of cognitive psychologists, 
whose theorizing has focused on factors such as the prototypicality (vs. atypicality) and diversity 
(vs. homogeneity) of the evidence, or the featural overlap between the evidence and the kind 
about which one is making inferences (e.g., Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1988; Markman, 1989; 
Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990; Rips, 1975; Sloman, 1993). Inferences about 
the features of kinds have also been hypothesized to stem from special-purpose cognitive 
modules that have evolved specifically because of their role in enabling fast, efficient judgments 
about kinds in domains important to survival (e.g., Atran, 1998; Pinker, 1994, 1997; Setoh, Wu, 
Baillargeon, & R. Gelman, 2013).  
In contrast, inferences about the traits of individuals have been a major concern for social 
psychologists, whose proposals have tended to focus on an entirely different set of issues. For 
example, prominent work in this area has highlighted the relationship of these inferences to 
patterns of covariation in the evidence (e.g., has the colleague donated to other charities?; 
Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967, 1973), their automaticity (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Trope & 
Gaunt, 2000; Uleman, 1999), and the errors they introduce into our judgments  (e.g., Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). Some have suggested that these 
inferences also originate from an innate module, except a different one than the module 
putatively responsible for kind inferences: a biologically adapted mechanism that emerged over 
the course of our species’ evolutionary history because it facilitated reasoning about other 
individuals’ psychological states and characteristics, including their dispositions (e.g., Hamlin, 
Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; A. Leslie, 1994; Luo & Baillargeon, 
2005; Pinker, 1994, 1997).  
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Thus, the existing literature seems to point to fundamentally different cognitive sources 
for people’s ability to reason about the features of kinds and traits of individuals. Here, however, 
we propose that kind-feature and individual-trait inferences have much more in common than 
previous research would lead one to expect. More precisely, our main hypothesis is that these 
two sorts of judgments may in fact stem from the same cognitive mechanism that can output 
inferences at different levels (about individuals vs. kinds), depending on factors such as the 
content and scope of the evidence or the reasoner’s goals in the moment. In other words, we 
argue that the differences in current psychological approaches to studying kind-feature and 
individual-trait inferences do not actually correspond to a difference in the mechanism 
underlying these inferences—rather, these discrepant approaches may mask a common source. 
To motivate this Shared Inferential Mechanism (SIM) Hypothesis, we provide a brief, selective 
overview of previous research on inferences about the features of kinds and the dispositions of 
individuals. Specifically, we summarize arguments and evidence pertaining to three dimensions 
of overlap between these two types of inferences: (1) their weak relationship to statistical 
evidence; (2) their resistance to counterexamples; and (3) their linguistic expression. We then 
describe five experiments we conducted to provide a formal test of the SIM Hypothesis.  
Weak Dependence on Statistical Evidence 
Inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals are similar by being 
only weakly dependent on the frequency of the relevant features or behaviors. People sometimes 
make inferences about kinds even when the features in question are very infrequent, whereas 
other times they do not make such inferences even when there is considerable statistical evidence 
to support them (e.g., Abelson & Kanouse, 1966; Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010; 
Cimpian, Gelman, & Brandone, 2010; see also Leslie, 2008). For example, people agree that 
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mosquitoes, as a kind, carry malaria, even though very few mosquitoes are in fact carriers of this 
disease. In contrast, people don’t think that bees, as a kind, are sterile, even though the vast 
majority of them actually are. Similarly inconsistent uses of statistical evidence are found with 
respect to inferences about the traits of individuals. Often, a single event or behavior is sufficient 
for observers to draw conclusions about the enduring dispositions of the actors involved (e.g., 
Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977; Trope & Gaunt, 2000; for reviews, see 
Gawronski, 2004; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Trope & Gaunt, 2007). Other times, however, even 
multiple behaviors consistent with a dispositional inference may not be sufficient for that 
inference to be formulated (e.g., Gidron, Koehler, & Tversky, 1993; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; 
Rothbart & Park, 1986; Tausch, Kenworthy, & Hewstone, 2007). For example, although we 
might conclude that a person is superstitious based on a single behavior, much more evidence is 
typically needed to formulate an inference about a person’s punctuality—showing up on time to 
a single meeting is far from sufficient, and several meetings may not be enough either (e.g., 
Rothbart & Park, 1986).  
Note that this loose relationship with the underlying frequencies (whereby a certain level 
of statistical evidence suffices for some kind-feature or individual-trait inferences but not others) 
is rather unusual. For many other types of inferences, their acceptability depends almost entirely 
on whether a certain frequency threshold is met. To illustrate, it would be legitimate to infer that 
some, most, every, all, etc., members of a kind display a feature if and only if a certain number of 
them do, regardless of what that feature is (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010). The same point applies to 
inferences over situations about whether a person sometimes, occasionally, always, etc., does 
something—all that matters is how often this person performs the relevant action. Thus, the 
inconsistencies in the evidentiary threshold for inductive inferences about the features of kinds 
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and the dispositions of individuals are a distinctive feature of these inferences,2 perhaps 
suggestive of a common source for the two. 
Resistance to Counterexamples 
Related to the point about weak dependence on statistical evidence, both kind-feature and 
individual-trait inferences are—once formulated—resistant to contradictory evidence. To begin, 
inferences about the features of kinds are typically not falsified by counterexamples. 
Encountering a cat that doesn’t meow or a dog with only three legs, for instance, does not cause 
people to reconsider whether cats meow and dogs have four legs. This robustness to 
counterexamples has been documented even when the inferences concern novel kinds: Four-
year-olds, for example, hold on to such inferences (e.g., that pagons are friendly) when they are 
presented with inconsistent evidence (e.g., a pagon that isn’t friendly; Chambers, Graham & 
Turner, 2008). Likewise, inferences about the traits of individuals are often resistant to 
counterevidence—that is, they are often maintained even in the face of behaviors that are 
inconsistent with the relevant traits. If we believe someone to be manipulative, for instance, 
behaviors that are inconsistent with this inferred disposition (e.g., an honest act) seldom change 
this belief (e.g., Garlick, 1993; Gidron, Koehler, & Tversky, 1993; Hayden & Michel, 1976).  
Linguistic Expression 
Semantic analyses of the typical linguistic expression of kind-feature and individual-trait 
inferences have suggested that there are deep structural similarities between them (e.g., Dahl, 
1975; Krifka et al., 1995; Lawler, 1973; Leslie, 2013). In fact, semanticists often classify 
statements expressing these two inferences as part of the same linguistic phenomenon, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This feature is not unique, however. Inferences quantified with many and often (e.g., Cova & Egré, under review; 
Keenan & Stavi, 1986) may be similar in this respect. For example, if someone drinks water once a day, it does not 
seem legitimate to infer that they drink water often. In contrast, if someone goes hiking once a day, it seems quite 
legitimate to infer that they go hiking often.  
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genericity. According to a standard treatment of genericity, the meaning of statements conveying 
kind-feature and individual-trait inferences can be formalized using the same (unpronounced) 
generic quantifier GEN (where GEN stands for generic; e.g., Krifka et al., 1995; Leslie, 2013).3  
In the case of statements expressing inferences about the features of kinds, GEN 
quantifies over the members of the relevant kinds. For example, the logical form of a sentence 
such as Cats meow might be represented as,  
GEN[x] [x is a cat] [x meows], 
where [x is a cat] specifies the domain over which generic quantification takes place (i.e., 
individual members of the cat kind) and [x meows] specifies the property being attributed to 
members of the set that is determined by the combination of the generic quantifier GEN and the 
domain restrictor [x is a cat]. A similar analysis is applied to statements expressing inferences 
about the traits of individuals, except in this case GEN quantifies over situations or occasions. 
For example, a sentence such as Mary is manipulative might be represented as,  
GEN[s] [s is a situation involving Mary] [Mary is being manipulative in s]. 
Here, the generic quantification is defined over the variable s (i.e., situations); the domain over 
which GEN operates is defined by the restrictor [s is a situation involving Mary]; and the 
property being quantified is defined by the final element, [Mary is being manipulative in s]. As 
may already be apparent, the logical form of this sentence is analogous to that of Cats meow, 
provided above. This analysis thus suggests that the meaning of statements that convey 
judgments about the features of kinds and the dispositions of individuals can be spelled out in 
terms of the same unvoiced, implicit quantifier. This idea is consistent with the present claim that 
these inferences are the products of the same cognitive mechanism but stands in contrast to their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To clarify, we are not claiming that inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals are expressed 
in language exclusively via statements that can be formalized with GEN. These statements are, however, a very 
common linguistic vehicle for such inferences, and thus their semantics are relevant to the present argument. 
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surface differences, as well as to their prior treatment in the psychological literature. 
The Present Research: Testing the Shared Inferential Mechanism Hypothesis 
The research reviewed above suggests that inferences about the features of kinds and the 
traits of individuals have several features in common. However, to our knowledge, no empirical 
studies have explored whether these inferences stem from the same cognitive mechanism. Not 
surprisingly, then, almost no experiments have directly compared the two types of inferences in a 
systematic way (for an exception, see Lawson & Kalish, 2006). Thus, our goal here was to 
provide a first test of the SIM Hypothesis.  
The logic of this test was as follows: Prior work in cognitive psychology and linguistics 
has suggested that inferences about the features of kinds exhibit a peculiar characteristic—
namely, they are sensitive to select aspects of the semantic content of the properties about which 
the inferences are being made. Specifically, properties that are (1) strongly negatively valenced 
(dangerous, threatening, etc.) or (2) unique/distinctive are inferred to characterize kinds based on 
less evidence than properties that are otherwise similar but are neither negative nor distinctive 
(e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010; Leslie, 2008). For example, people generalize a dangerous-sounding 
property such as having poisonous red feathers to a novel kind more readily than a property such 
as having red feathers, even when given the same amount of evidence (e.g., that 30% of the 
kind’s members display the feature). Similarly, a property such as having red feathers is more 
readily generalized to a novel kind when it is said to be present only among members of that kind 
(i.e., when it is unique/distinctive) than when members of other kinds are said to display it as 
well. To return to our argument, if inferences about the properties of kinds and the traits of 
individuals are computed via the same mechanism (as we propose), then content should matter in 
exactly the same way for inferences about the dispositional traits of individuals. That is, events 
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involving dangerous or distinctive behaviors should lead to inferences about enduring 
dispositions particularly readily compared to events involving other behaviors. In sum, the 
present experiments test the hypothesis that kind-feature and individual-trait inferences are 
generated via the same mechanism by varying the content of the information over which these 
inferences are computed while equating all other variables (e.g., the strength of the evidence). 
The prediction of the SIM Hypothesis is that the two inferences would be affected by these 
content manipulations in a similar manner. 
The prior evidence on whether, and how, inferences about individual dispositions are 
influenced by content is mixed—particularly with respect to the valence of the content. For 
instance, some studies have suggested a negativity bias, wherein people require less evidence to 
make inferences about negatively-valenced dispositions than positively-valenced ones (a result 
that is broadly consistent with our hypothesis; e.g., Aloise, 1993; Gidron et al., 1993; Rothbart & 
Park, 1986). Several linguists have made similar suggestions. For example, Carlson (1977) 
pointed out that less evidence seems needed to endorse the truth of a sentence such as John beats 
small children than of a sentence such as John repairs cars. Other studies, however, have found 
the exact opposite: a positivity bias (e.g., Heyman & Giles, 2004; Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 
2002; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). For instance, Heyman and Giles (2004) found that both children 
and adults were more likely to make dispositional inferences based on positively- than 
negatively-valenced evidence (e.g., John getting a good grade vs. a bad grade; see Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987, and Martijn, Spears, van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992, for additional discussion of 
these apparently contradictory findings).  
With respect to distinctiveness, the prior evidence seems more consistently in line with 
our prediction that dispositional inferences would go through more easily for behaviors or events 
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that are unique (e.g., Higgins & Bryant, 1982; McArthur, 1972; Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 
1975). For example, when told that Mary loved a certain movie but nobody else did (which is 
what Kelley [1967, 1973] called low consensus information), people are more likely to infer a 
dispositional trait (e.g., Mary loves movies) than if told that everyone else loved that movie as 
well (high consensus information). Although these results are consistent with our prediction, in 
none of these studies were participants also asked to make inferences about kinds based on 
analogous evidence. The multiple methodological differences between these studies and those 
investigating inferences about the features of kinds (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010) make it difficult 
to draw conclusions about the SIM Hypothesis from this evidence. When also considering the 
contradictory findings with respect to valence, it is clear that the prior literature provides no more 
than encouraging hints regarding the prediction that judgments about the features of kinds and 
the traits of individuals are similarly affected by property content. 
We conducted five experiments to test the SIM Hypothesis. Across these experiments, 
the likelihood of making kind-feature and individual-trait inferences was assessed using a 
procedure that was closely matched across the two types of inferences, which afforded strong 
comparisons between them. Experiments 1 and 3 investigated the contribution of danger and 
distinctiveness, respectively, to the likelihood of drawing inferences about the features of kinds 
and the traits of individuals. The results of these experiments supported our prediction: Danger 
and distinctiveness had an almost identical facilitative effect on the two inferences, as would be 
expected if they were the output of the same cognitive mechanism. Experiments 2 and 4 explored 
the specificity of this effect: Would danger and distinctiveness connotations also have an impact 
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on the likelihood of making quantified4 inferences over individuals (some/all Xs do Y) and 
situations (X sometimes/always does Y)? The results of Experiments 2 and 4 found no evidence 
for an effect of property content on these quantified inferences, suggesting that inferences about 
the features of kinds and traits of individuals share a relatively unusual signature. The final 
experiment explored an unexpected difference between kind-feature and individual-trait 
inferences that emerged in Experiments 1 and 3—namely, the fact that inferences about the traits 
of individuals were made more frequently overall than inferences about the features of kinds, 
given equivalent levels of evidence. The results of Experiment 5 suggested that this difference is 
more likely to be due to ambiguities in the linguistic stimuli used to express these inferences 
rather than to differences in their cognitive source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For the rest of the paper, the term quantified will be used to refer to overt, explicit quantification (that is, 
quantification explicitly marked in language, as with some or all). Thus, generic quantification (e.g., Krifka et al., 
1995) is excluded from the scope of this term as used from this point on.	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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF VALENCE ON KIND-FEATURE AND 
INDIVIDUAL-TRAIT INFERENCES 
 
As a first test of the SIM Hypothesis, in this experiment we explored the influence of 
valence on inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions, depending on the type of inference assessed. In the 
Kind-Features condition, participants were provided with evidence about the prevalence of a 
feature among the members of an unfamiliar kind (e.g., zorbs) and were then asked whether the 
corresponding kind-feature inference is valid. Half of the stimulus features were negatively-
valenced, referring specifically to acts that are dangerous to humans (e.g., chopping people’s 
heads off), and half were neutral in valence (e.g., climbing trees). In the Individual-Traits 
condition, participants were provided with evidence about the prevalence of a behavior in the life 
of an unfamiliar individual (e.g., Zorb) and were then asked whether the corresponding 
individual-trait inference is valid. As in the other condition, half of the stimulus behaviors were 
dangerous acts (e.g., chopping people’s heads off), whereas the other half were neutral (e.g., 
climbing trees). In the context of this experiment, the prediction of the Shared Inferential 
Mechanism Hypothesis is that both kind-feature and individual-trait inferences would be made 
more readily based on evidence with connotations of danger. 
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 198; 86 men, 112 women) were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk service. They received $0.75 for participation. All participants reported being 
native English speakers on a prescreening question. An additional 36 participants were tested but 
excluded from the final sample because their IP addresses were from outside the United States (n 
= 7) or because they failed an attention check at the end of the study (see below; n = 29).  
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Materials, procedure, and design. The instructions for participants were identical in the 
Kind-Features and Individual-Traits conditions: 
In this study, we will tell you about some animals that live on a planet in a remote galaxy. 
For each question, you will be given some evidence and then you will be asked to judge 
if a certain conclusion follows from that evidence.  
The two conditions diverged, however, in terms of the information provided on each of the 24 
trials that followed the instruction screen (see Table 1 for an example). In the Kind-Features 
condition, participants were told about a kind (e.g., zorbs) and were then provided with evidence 
about the prevalence of a feature among its members (e.g., 30% of zorbs climb trees). Finally, 
the subjects were asked whether this evidence licenses the conclusion that the feature applies to 
the kind as a whole (see Table 1). Specifically, participants were asked whether the 
corresponding generic statement (e.g., “zorbs climb trees”) is true or false. 
On each trial of the Individual-Traits condition, participants were told about an individual 
(e.g., Zorb) and were then provided with evidence about the prevalence of a behavior in this 
individual’s life (e.g., Zorb has climbed trees in 30% of the situations where he had the 
opportunity). The qualifier “where he had the opportunity” was added to avoid ambiguity; 
without this qualifier, the meaning of the percentage is ambiguous because it is unclear what is 
included in the denominator (e.g., are we counting situations where Zorb is sleeping? how about 
situations where there are no trees around?). Finally, participants were asked whether this 
evidence licenses an inference about an enduring disposition (e.g., “Zorb climbs trees”; see Table 
1). 
Because sentences such as “zorbs climb trees” and “Zorb climbs trees” are understood to 
express claims about the features of kinds and the dispositions of individuals, respectively (e.g., 
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Cimpian et al., 2010; Krifka et al., 1995; Leslie, 2008), asking subjects about the truth value of 
these statements was an easy, intuitive means of assessing their endorsement of the 
corresponding conclusions/inferences. 
We used four items: two that had strong danger connotations (chopping people’s heads 
off and ripping out people’s guts), and two that did not (climbing trees and digging holes in the 
ground). Each item was presented at six levels of evidence (1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, and 70%; 
4 items × 6 levels of evidence = 24 trials). A different novel name was used on each trial (e.g., 
blins/Blin, ludinos/Ludino). Moreover, each name was assigned to a “dangerous” item for half of 
the subjects and to a “plain” item for the other half; this counterbalancing was designed to avoid 
confounding property content with particular sets of names. The order of the trials was 
randomized individually for each participant.   
 At the end of the task, we asked a question designed to check whether participants had 
paid attention: “Please think back to the task you just completed. Did the questions ask about 
single individuals or entire species?” Twenty-nine participants failed this attention check and 
were thus excluded from the sample. Participants then completed a demographics questionnaire 
and were debriefed about the goals of the study. 
To summarize, the design of the study was as follows: 2 (inference type: Kind-Features 
vs. Individual-Traits; between subjects) × 2 (property content: dangerous vs. plain; within 
subject) × 6 (level of evidence: 1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, and 70%; within subject). The main 
dependent measure was the proportion of inferences endorsed by subjects within each cell of this 
design. These data were submitted to analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with Bonferroni-adjusted 
follow-up tests where needed. 
Results and discussion 
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The main prediction of the SIM Hypothesis was that both kind-feature and individual-
trait inferences would be endorsed more often when the evidence carries connotations of danger 
and threat. In the context of a 2 (inference) × 2 (property content) × 6 (evidence level) ANOVA, 
this broad prediction translates into two finer-grained predictions: First, we expect a significant 
main effect of property content (with more inferences for the dangerous items) and/or a 
significant interaction between property content and evidence level (with more inferences for the 
dangerous items at the lower evidence levels but perhaps not at the higher ones, where we may 
see ceiling effects). Second, we expect that neither of the above effects will be moderated by the 
type of inference assessed. This absence of significant interactions between (1) inference type 
(kind-feature vs. individual-trait) and content, and (2) inference type, content, and level of 
evidence would suggest that the facilitative effect of danger-related content is not different for 
inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals, in line with the SIM 
Hypothesis.  
The results of the ANOVA provided support for these predictions. First, we found an 
overall inferential advantage for the dangerous items, F(1, 196) = 7.16, p = .008, η2p = .035, 
which was qualified by the expected interaction with evidence level, F(5, 980) = 2.85, p = .015, 
η2p = .014. As illustrated in Figure 1, the inferential advantage for dangerous items was most 
apparent at the lower evidence levels (1% level: p = .004; 5% level: p = .039); in contrast, higher 
levels of evidence licensed almost uniform endorsement of the inferences, with no differences by 
property content. 
Second, we explored whether the effect of property content was moderated by the type of 
inference participants were asked to make (kind-feature vs. individual-trait). As predicted, there 
was no evidence of such moderation: Neither the inference × property content interaction, F(1, 
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196) = 0.03, p = .852, nor the inference × property content × evidence level interaction, F(5, 980) 
= 0.93, p = .460, was significant. These results are consistent with the claim that property content 
has an analogous effect on kind-feature and individual-trait inferences (see also Figure 1).  
Finally, the ANOVA revealed several other main effects and interactions. The main 
effect of evidence level, F(5, 980) = 84.66, p < .001, η2p = .302, suggested that participants were 
more likely to endorse inferences for which they had more evidence (see Figure 1). Interestingly, 
we also found a main effect of inference type, F(1, 196) = 39.24, p < .001, η2p = .167, and an 
interaction between inference type and evidence level, F(5, 980) = 11.12, p < .001, η2p = .054. 
Participants endorsed more individual-trait than kind-feature inferences overall (for a similar 
result, see Lawson & Kalish, 2006), and particularly at the lower levels of evidence. We will 
explore several explanations for these differences (e.g., possible ambiguities in the stimulus 
statements, difficulties in truly equating the evidence for the two types of inferences) in 
Experiment 5 and the General Discussion.  
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that both inferences about the features of 
kinds and inferences about the traits of individuals are similarly facilitated by information with 
strong negative valence. These findings are consistent with the claim that these two types of 
inferences are the outputs of a single underlying mechanism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2: NO EFFECT OF VALENCE ON QUANTIFIED INFERENCES OVER 
INDIVIDUALS AND SITUAIONS  
The effect of valence on kind-feature and individual-trait inferences (Experiment 1) 
suggests a common source for these inferences. However, the claim of a special shared origin for 
these inferences would be strengthened if we also found that the effect of valence was not 
broadly shared by other sorts of inferences. Providing such evidence was our goal in the present 
experiment. Specifically, we tested whether the valence effects observed in Experiment 1 would 
also be obtained for two other types of specific-to-general inferences that operate over 
individuals and situations: namely, existentially-quantified (some/sometimes) and universally-
quantified (all/always) inferences. The prediction of the SIM Hypothesis is that danger 
connotations should have no effect on the likelihood of making these other, quantified, 
inferences. Rather, these inferences should be wholly dependent on the amount of evidence 
provided, not its content. For example, the only determinant of whether it is legitimate to 
conclude that all zorbs display a certain feature should be how many of them display this feature, 
not whether the feature is dangerous or plain.    
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 221; 67 men, 109 women; demographic information for 
the remaining 45 subjects was not recorded) were recruited from two sources: a university 
undergraduate subject pool and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Participants received partial 
course credit or $0.75, respectively, for their participation. An additional 27 subjects were tested 
but excluded from the final sample either because their IP addresses were from outside the US (n 
= 6) or because they failed the attention check at the end of the study (n = 21).  
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Materials, procedure, and design. The method of this experiment was identical to that 
of Experiment 1, with one key exception: Participants were asked to make quantified inferences 
over individuals and situations. Specifically, participants were asked to judge statements 
expressing either existential generalizations (e.g., “Some zorbs climb trees,” “Zorb sometimes 
climbs trees”) or universal generalizations (e.g., “All zorbs climb trees,” “Zorb always climbs 
trees”).  
Thus, the design of this study was as follows: 2 (quantification type: existential 
[some/sometimes] vs. universal [all/always]; between subjects) × 2 (inference type: over 
individuals [some/all] vs. over situations [sometimes/always]; between subjects) × 2 (property 
content: dangerous vs. plain; within subject) × 6 (level of evidence: 1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, 
and 70%; within subject).  
Results and Discussion 
The main prediction of the SIM Hypothesis was that the quantified inferences tested here 
should not be influenced by property content. Thus, we expect the main effect of property 
content and its interaction with evidence level—both of which were significant in Experiment 
1—to be non-significant here. This prediction was confirmed: As shown in Figure 2, quantified 
inferences about the danger-related items were endorsed to the same extent as quantified 
inferences about the plain items both in the aggregate, F(1, 217) = 0.18, p = .670, and when the 
different levels of evidence are taken into account, F(5, 1085) = 1.50, p = .187. 
The only significant effect involving property content was the four-way interaction 
between all factors in the ANOVA, F(5, 1085) = 2.67, p = .021, η2p = .012. Importantly, however, 
an inspection of the relevant means and follow-up comparisons uncovered no evidence of an 
advantage for the dangerous items. The four-way interaction seemed to be driven by an unusual 
 	   18	  
pattern of differences in participants’ existentially-quantified inferences across situations (X 
sometimes does Y): At the 1% evidence level, participants made stronger inferences from the 
plain evidence than from the danger-related evidence (p = .005), whereas at the 10% evidence 
level they made stronger inferences from the danger-related evidence (p = .003). Analogous 
differences were not found for the existentially-quantified inferences over individuals (some Xs 
do Y), or for either type of universally-quantified inferences; these asymmetries in turn led to the 
significant four-way interaction. While this interaction is not easy to interpret, it also provides 
little support for the claim that negatively-valenced information facilitates quantified inferences. 
The other significant effects uncovered by the ANOVA were as follows: Existentially-
quantified inferences were endorsed more often than universally-quantified ones, F(1, 217) = 
1353.17, p < .001, η2p = .862, particularly at the lower prevalence levels, F(5, 1085) = 12.84, p < 
.001, η2p = .056. And, as expected, the likelihood of endorsing these two types of quantified 
inferences was higher at the higher levels of evidence, F(5, 1085) = 17.69, p < .001, η2p = .075.   
Together, these results suggest that quantified (existential and universal) inferences are 
not facilitated by information that has connotations of threat and danger. As a result, the fact that 
both inferences about the features of kinds and inferences about the traits of individuals are 
facilitated by this information makes it all the more plausible that they stem from the operation 
of the same separate cognitive mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 3: THE EFFECT OF DISTINCTIVENESS ON KIND-FEATURE AND 
INDIVIDUAL-TRAIT INFERENCES 
In this experiment, we explored the influence of distinctiveness on inferences about the 
features of kinds and the traits of individuals. The SIM Hypothesis predicts that both types of 
inferences would be facilitated in a similar manner when the properties/behaviors that constitute 
the evidence are distinctive or unique. 
Method  
Participants. Participants (N = 194; 69 men, 123 women; 1 participant did not report 
gender and another reported “male and female”) were recruited from two sources: a university 
undergraduate subject pool and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. An additional 16 subjects 
were tested but excluded from the final sample either because their IP addresses were from 
outside the US (n = 2) or because they failed the attention check (n = 14).  
Materials, procedure, and design. The method of this experiment was identical to that 
of Experiment 1, except for the items. In this experiment, we manipulated the distinctiveness of 
the items by including additional information that suggested the relevant properties were either 
distinctive or commonplace (see Table 3 for an example). Each of the four items used in this 
study (climbing trees, digging holes in the ground, making nests out of grass, and washing 
oneself with water) was said to be distinctive for approximately half of the participants and 
commonplace/plain for the other half. Thus, across subjects, the actual properties about which 
participants made their judgments were equated between the distinctive and plain items. 
In summary, the design of this study was as follows: 2 (inference type: Kind-Features vs. 
Individual-Traits; between subjects) × 2 (property content: distinctive vs. plain; within subject) × 
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6 (level of evidence: 1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, and 70%; within subject). 
Results and Discussion 
As before, the SIM Hypothesis makes two main predictions. First, the distinctive items 
should license more inferences than the plain items, especially at the lower levels of evidence. 
Second, this facilitative effect should not be moderated by whether participants are asked to 
make inferences about the features of kinds or the traits of individuals. 
In line with the first prediction, the ANOVA uncovered a significant interaction between 
property content and level of evidence, F(5, 960) = 2.57, p = .025, η2p = .013. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, the effect of distinctiveness was present when the evidence was weak (5% level: p = 
.089; 10% level: p = .023) and absent when the evidence was more abundant. The overall main 
effect of property content did not reach significance in this study, F(1, 192) = 2.10, p = .149, η2p = 
.011.5 
In line with the second prediction, there was no evidence that the type of inference 
participants were making moderated the facilitative effect of distinctiveness. Neither the two-
way interaction between inference type and property content, F(1, 192) = 0.23, p = .629, nor the 
three-way interaction between these two factors and evidence level, F(5, 960) = 0.32, p = .904, 
was significant. 
The remaining effects uncovered by the ANOVA were analogous to those found in 
Experiment 1. First, there was a significant main effect of evidence level, F(5, 960) = 112.82, p < 
.001, η2p = .370, indicating that participants were more likely to make inferences when more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Overall, these effects are smaller in magnitude than those in Cimpian et al.’s (2010) experiments, which 
investigated the impact of danger and distinctiveness on inferences about kinds. There are multiple methodological 
differences that could explain the differences in the magnitude of the effects (e.g., the content of the stimuli, the 
testing circumstances [in-lab vs. online]). To illustrate, the stimulus sentences used here do not include the words 
“dangerous” or “distinctive,” whereas Cimpian et al.’s did (e.g., “Lorches have purple feathers” [plain] vs. “Lorches 
have distinctive purple feathers” [distinctive; emphasis added]). It is possible that subtle differences of this sort have 
a non-trivial impact on participants’ judgments. 
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evidence was provided. Second, inferences about the traits of individuals were overall more 
frequent than inferences about the features of kinds, F(1, 192) = 19.36, p < .001, η2p = .092, but 
particularly at the lower levels of evidence, F(5, 960) = 6.63, p < .001, η2p = .033 (see also Figure 
3). Additional discussion of this difference will be provided in Experiment 5 and the General 
Discussion. 
In sum, the results of the present study suggest that both kind-feature and individual-trait 
inferences are made more easily when the properties under consideration are unique or 
distinctive. These results provide converging support for the proposal that inferences about the 
features of kinds and the dispositional traits of individuals are generated by the same cognitive 
process. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 4: NO EFFECT OF DISTINCTIVENESS ON QUANTIFIED 
INFERENCES OVER INDIVIDUALS AND SITUATIONS  
Is the facilitative effect of distinctiveness specific to kind-feature and individual-trait 
inferences? If so, that would reinforce the argument that these inferences are both the outputs of 
a single, separate cognitive mechanism. Thus, in the present experiment we tested the prediction 
that the distinctiveness of a property has no effect on the likelihood of drawing quantified 
(existential and universal) inferences. 
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 213; 88 men, 118 women, 1 not reporting gender; 
demographic information for the remaining 6 subjects was not recorded due to a programming 
error) were recruited from two sources: a university undergraduate subject pool and Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk service. An additional 20 subjects were excluded because they failed the 
attention check (n = 20). 
Materials, procedure, and design. The method of this study was identical to that of 
Experiment 2 (which also looked at quantified inferences), except that the items were taken from 
Experiment 3. Thus, this experiment had the following design: 2 (quantification type: existential 
[some/sometimes] vs. universal [all/always]; between subjects) × 2 (inference type: over 
individuals [some/all] vs. over situations [sometimes/always]; between subjects) × 2 (property 
content: distinctive vs. plain; within subject) × 6 (level of evidence: 1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, 
and 70%; within subject).  
Results and Discussion 
Consistent with the SIM Hypothesis, the ANOVA revealed no evidence that property 
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content had any influence on participants’ quantified inferences (see Figure 4). In fact, none of 
the interactions involving property content even approached significance, nor did its main effect, 
Fs < 0.54, ps > .465.  
The only significant results were the more obvious ones involving level of evidence and 
quantification type: Participants made more existential than universal inferences, F(1, 209) = 
1523.69, p < .001, η2p = .879, particularly at the lower prevalence levels,  F(5, 1045) = 12.60, p < 
.001, η2p = .057. They also made more inferences from stronger evidence, F(5, 1045) = 29.24, p < 
.001, η2p = .123. An unexpected additional result was that participants made significantly more 
existentially-quantified inferences over individuals (e.g., “Some zorbs climb trees”) than over 
situations (e.g., “Zorb sometimes climbs trees”) at the lowest two evidence levels (1% and 5%), 
ps < .038. Because similar differences were absent at the higher levels of evidence, as well as for 
the universally-quantified inferences, the ANOVA revealed a significant three-way interaction 
between quantification type, inference type, and evidence level, F(5, 1045) = 2.84, p = .015, η2p = 
.013.6 For our purposes here, however, the important thing to keep in mind is that the content of 
the properties was not involved in any of these effects. 
The results of this experiment suggest that existentially- and universally-quantified 
inferences are not influenced by the distinctiveness of the properties being considered. Together 
with the results of Experiment 2 (which suggested that danger/threat connotations are irrelevant 
to these inferences as well), these findings provide support for the conclusion that sensitivity to 
content may be specific to kind-feature and individual-trait inferences. In turn, this conclusion 
reinforces the Shared Inferential Mechanism Hypothesis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This three-way interaction subsumed two lower-order interactions: that between generalization type (over 
individuals vs. over situations) and level of evidence, F(5, 1045) = 4.82, p < .001, η2p = .023, and that between 
generalization type and quantification type, F(1, 209) = 5.27, p = .023, η2p = .025. 
 	   24	  
CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 5: WHY WERE INDIVIDUAL-TRAIT INFERENCES ENDORSED 
MORE OFTEN THAN KIND-FEATURE INFERENCES? 
We are proposing that inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals 
have a common cognitive source. Although the evidence so far is consistent with this possibility, 
we also found that people seem overall more willing to make inferences about the traits of 
individuals than about the features of kinds, even when given what appears to be the same 
evidence (see Experiments 1 and 3). Does this difference speak against the SIM Hypothesis? In 
the present experiment, we explored a plausible reason to think it does not—that is, we explored 
an explanation for this difference that is compatible with the existence of a single underlying 
mechanism. This explanation was prompted by some of our participants’ comments in an open-
ended question during the debriefing portion of the studies. When asked to describe their 
approach to the task, a number of participants in the Individual-Traits conditions of Experiments 
1 and 3 provided answers suggesting that they interpreted the stimulus sentences (e.g., “Zorb 
climbs trees”) as expressing not a dispositional inference (roughly, Zorb is generally disposed to 
climb trees), as we had intended, but rather an ability (roughly, Zorb is able to climb trees). For 
instance, one person said, “Even if the animal only did something in 1 percent of presented 
opportunities, that animal can do that behavior”; another stated, “I answered all the questions 
true because no matter the percentage the animal mentioned could perform the act stated” (our 
italics).  
If the ability interpretation of our stimulus sentences was common, it could explain why 
participants were endorsing these statements so freely: Intuitively, endorsement of ability 
statements of this sort requires minimal evidence. Even if John has run a four-minute mile only 
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once, for example, it still logically follows that he is capable of running a four-minute mile. This 
is a deductive inference—no inductive leap is involved, and no further evidence is needed. 
Importantly, this problem does not extend to the stimulus statements we used to assess 
participants’ inferences about the features of kinds (e.g., “zorbs climb trees”). In this case, even 
if the evidence (e.g., 1% of zorbs climb trees) was interpreted as signaling an ability (e.g., these 
1% can climb trees), a participant would still have to perform an inductive inference in order to 
conclude that the kind as a whole possesses this ability. The trivial, deductive option is not 
available here, which suggests that endorsement of the conclusions in the Kind-Features 
condition is unlikely to have been artificially inflated. 
Our goal in Experiment 5 was to investigate these issues more formally. Specifically, we 
assessed (1) the extent to which people adopt the ability interpretation of sentences such as those 
used in our Individual-Traits conditions, (2) the extent to which adopting this interpretation leads 
to higher endorsement of the truth of these statements, and (3) whether taking these ability 
interpretations into account would be sufficient to explain the endorsement differences between 
kind-feature and individual-trait statements (such as those observed in Experiments 1 and 3). If 
the ability interpretation is found to be common among participants, to promote high levels of 
endorsement, and to explain away the apparent differences between the individual-trait and kind-
feature inferences, then we would have good reason to attribute the unexpected differences found 
in previous studies to ambiguities in our stimulus sentences. 
Method 
Participants. Participants (N = 132; 63 men, 69 women) were recruited from the 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. An additional 16 subjects were excluded either because 
their IP addresses were outside the US (n = 3) or because they failed the attention check (n = 13).  
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Materials, procedure, and design. The method of this study was similar to that of 
Experiment 3, including a Kind-Features and an Individual-Traits condition, each with 24 trials. 
There were, however, two major differences from the method of Experiment 3. First, we no 
longer manipulated distinctiveness—that is, we removed mention of whether the properties were 
displayed by few versus many other animals. The distinctiveness manipulation was omitted 
because in this study we are simply interested in people’s interpretation of the conclusion 
statements (e.g., “Zorb climbs trees”).  
Second, we assessed the appeal of the ability interpretation for the statements in the 
Individual-Traits condition (where such an interpretation would be problematic). Specifically, we 
asked participants in the Individual-Traits condition to evaluate several paraphrases of the 
stimulus sentences. Participants were told, for example, “Imagine you need to paraphrase the 
following statement: Kazz climbs trees. How good are the following paraphrases?” The 
paraphrase of most interest here was the one that described an ability (e.g., “Kazz is able to climb 
trees”); the other two paraphrases presented to subjects will be described below. Participants 
marked their evaluations of the paraphrases on a scale from 1 (“not good at all”) to 9 (“very 
good”). These paraphrase questions were asked at the very end of the task, after participants 
completed the 24 trials of the main task. To minimize interference from these prior judgments, 
the stimulus sentences were paired with novel names that had not occurred in the main task (e.g., 
Kazz instead of Zorb). For comparison purposes, we also elicited evaluations of two other 
paraphrases, both of which conveyed quantified inferences: a broad-scope paraphrase (e.g., 
“Kazz generally climbs trees”) and a narrow-scope paraphrase (e.g., “Kazz sometimes climbs 
trees”). The meaning of these quantified paraphrases provides only a rough approximation of a 
dispositional generalization (e.g., Krifka et al., 1995), which—as explained in the introduction—
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is much less tied to specific frequencies than quantified generalizations are. Nevertheless, these 
quantified paraphrases can provide a useful point of comparison for the ability paraphrases. The 
presentation order of the three paraphrases was randomized individually for each participant. 
Results and discussion 
The first goal of this study was to determine the extent to which participants interpret the 
stimulus statements we used to probe individual-trait inferences as expressing an ability to 
perform a certain behavior. Participants’ evaluation of the ability paraphrases suggested that 
these paraphrases were indeed deemed quite good, M = 7.39 on a 1 (“not good at all”) to 9 (“very 
good”) scale (SD = 1.90). This rating was significantly above the midpoint of the 1–9 scale, t(64) 
= 10.17, p < .001. For a comparison with the “generally” and “sometimes” paraphrases, 
participants’ ratings were entered into a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA. This analysis 
revealed that participants differentiated between the three paraphrases, F(2, 128) = 21.36, p < 
.001, η2p = .250, with the ability paraphrase being judged more acceptable than both the 
“generally” (M = 5.12, SD = 2.33) and the “sometimes” (M = 6.00, SD = 2.08) paraphrases, ps < 
.001. Together, these results suggest that the ability interpretation of Individual-Traits sentences 
in Experiments 1 and 3 (e.g., “Zorb climbs trees”) may have been relatively prevalent and may 
thus have been a strong competitor for the dispositional inference interpretation, which is the one 
we had intended for these sentences. 
The second goal of this study was to test the link between ability interpretations of the 
stimulus sentences and higher endorsement of these sentences in the main task: Were the 
participants who favored the ability interpretation of the stimulus sentences also more likely to 
endorse these statements as true no matter what the evidence? Such a correlation seems likely, 
especially given that that the ability interpretation is only a small step removed from even the 
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lowest level of evidence. Indeed, there was a significant positive correlation between 
participants’ rating of the ability paraphrases and their average endorsement of the stimulus 
statements in the main task, r(63) = .30, p = .017. This relationship was present even when we 
partialled out participants’ ratings of the “generally” and “sometimes” paraphrases, rs(62) = .29 
and .32, ps = .022 and .010, respectively. These results suggest that, as predicted, adopting an 
ability interpretation of the stimulus sentences may make it easier to accept these statements on 
the basis of the evidence provided in the main task. 
 The third goal of this study was to assess whether the differences observed in 
Experiments 1 and 3 between kind-feature and individual-trait responses might be explained by 
the availability of ability interpretations. If these interpretations are sufficient to account for the 
observed differences, then the Individual-Traits participants who did not favor the ability 
interpretations should behave similarly to the Kind-Features participants. To investigate this 
prediction, we first divided our Individual-Traits condition into two subsamples based on 
whether participants gave the ability paraphrase the highest rating among the three paraphrases 
(n = 47) or not (n = 18). We then submitted these data to a 3 (group: Individual-Traits [ability 
interpretation favored] vs. Individual-Traits [ability interpretation disfavored] vs. Kind-Features) 
× 6 (level of evidence: 1%, 5%, 10%, 30%, 50%, and 70%) ANOVA.  
Consistent with our prediction, the results of this ANOVA suggested that differences 
between the Kind-Features and Individual-Traits conditions are reduced to non-significance 
when the confounding effect of ability interpretations is taken into account. To illustrate, 
pairwise comparisons that followed up on the main effect of group, F(2, 129) = 11.27, p < .001, 
η2p = .149, revealed no significant difference between the Kind-Features participants (M = .54 
true responses, SD = .37) and the Individual-Traits participants who did not favor the ability 
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interpretation (M = .68, SD = .25), p = .365. However, as predicted, the Kind-Features 
participants were significantly less likely to endorse the stimulus statements than the Individual-
Traits participants who did favor the ability interpretation (M = .83, SD = .26), p < .001.  
To summarize, the results of this experiment established three main conclusions. First, 
the stimulus sentences used to probe inferences about the dispositions of individuals (e.g., “Zorb 
climbs trees”) also admit a relatively salient ability interpretation (e.g., Zorb is able to climb 
trees). Second, this interpretation leads to agreement with these sentences based on a trivial 
amount of evidence, without the need for any sort of inductive leap. Third, the availability of 
these ability interpretations seems to be a key reason for the differences observed in Experiments 
1 and 3 between the overall acceptability of kind-feature and individual-trait inferences. In the 
present experiment, the difference between these two conditions was no longer significant when 
considering just the participants who disfavored the ability interpretation for the Individual-
Traits stimulus sentences. However, some caution may be warranted with respect to this last 
result: Although the condition difference was not significant, the averages still point to lower 
endorsement of the stimulus sentences in the Kind-Features condition (.54, as opposed to .68 for 
the Individual-Traits participants who disfavored the ability interpretations). In addition, this 
comparison may have been underpowered, as there were only 18 participants in our sample who 
did not prefer the ability interpretation. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence from this study 
suggests that stimulus ambiguity is one possible explanation for the differences previously 
observed between inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals. By helping 
to explain this unexpected difference, this evidence also reinforces the proposal that these 
inferences may be the products of the same cognitive mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Human learning is powerful in large part because we are able to formulate broad 
inferences based on limited first-hand evidence. These inferences are incredibly diverse—they 
take a variety of forms and serve a variety of uses, from learning about the phonology of one’s 
language (e.g., Kuhl, 2004) to developing a general “working model” of attachment relationships 
(e.g., Bowlby, 1982; Johnson, Chen, & Dweck, 2007) to learning about the edible resources in 
one’s environment (e.g., Wertz & Wynn, 2014). This diversity of forms and functions is likely to 
be accompanied by a diversity of underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. However, functional 
differences among inferences may not always correspond to differences in underlying 
mechanisms. In fact, in this paper we propose that two types of inferences that are different both 
in their form and in their use—and that might at first appear to be the products of different 
cognitive systems—may actually share an origin. The first type consists of inductive inferences 
about the features of categories, which are a crucial component of learning about the natural 
world (e.g., Keil, 1989; Markman, 1989; Murphy, 2002; Smith & Medin, 1981). The second type 
consists of inductive inferences about the dispositions of the individuals with whom we interact, 
which are a crucial component of navigating our complex social world (e.g., Heider, 1958; 
Gilbert, 1998; Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977). Despite the multiple differences between these two 
types of inferences (e.g., in their function, their scope, and their prior treatment in the 
psychological literature), we propose that they are in fact computed by the same cognitive 
process.    
Of course, demonstrating beyond doubt that two judgments have the same cognitive 
origin is not a trivial task—just as it is not trivial to determine whether, say, two anonymous 
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paintings were made by the same artist. In such circumstances, one reasonable strategy is to look 
for certain “signatures” associated with the suspected originator. If these trademark features are 
present in both instances, then one might be able to claim a shared origin. One’s confidence in 
this claim may be increased further if the relevant signatures were also unusual. For example, it 
would not help much if the presumed artist’s signature brushstroke was in fact shared by most 
painters of that period. This is, in broad outline, the strategy we adopted here with respect to 
inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals. Prior research has revealed 
two signatures of kind-feature inferences: namely, that they are facilitated by (1) danger-relevant 
and (2) distinctive properties (Cimpian et al., 2010; Leslie, 2008). Here, we tested whether 
individual-trait inferences exhibit these signatures as well. To provide further evidence for the 
claim of a common source or mechanism, we also sought to show that these signatures are not 
shared by other types of inferences. 
Summary of Results 
The results of our five experiments supported the SIM Hypothesis. Experiments 1 and 3 
suggested that inferences about the dispositional traits of individuals are indeed facilitated by 
danger-related and distinctive behaviors, just as inferences about the features of kinds are. Of 
note, the procedure for testing these two types of inferences was—in all relevant respects—
identical (see Tables 1 and 3); this feature of the design enables us to draw strong conclusions 
from these comparisons. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 4 established that the two signatures of 
kind-feature and individual-trait inferences are unusual, at least insofar as they are not shared by 
existentially-quantified (some/sometimes) and universally-quantified (all/always) inferences over 
situations and individuals. This result strengthens the claim that kind-feature and individual-trait 
inferences have a common origin, just as one might be more confident that two paintings are the 
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work of the same artist if they shared a highly unusual brushstroke pattern.  
Finally, Experiment 5 followed up on an unexpected difference between kind-feature and 
individual-trait inferences, wherein the latter were more frequently endorsed than the former. In 
Experiment 5, we suggested that this overall difference may have been an artifact of the stimulus 
sentences used to probe dispositional inferences. These sentences admitted another salient 
interpretation that did not require participants to go beyond the evidence. Specifically, these 
sentences could have been interpreted as conveying that, if an individual performs a behavior, 
then that individual has the ability to perform that behavior. Because this ability interpretation 
made it acceptable to endorse the stimulus sentences on the basis of minimal evidence, it also 
gave rise to an apparent advantage for the individual-trait inferences. However, when we 
adjusted for this ability interpretation in Experiment 5, this unexpected advantage became 
smaller and fell to non-significance.  
There are other potential reasons to doubt that the observed endorsement advantage for 
individual-trait over kind-feature inferences contradicts the SIM Hypothesis. For instance, one 
reason is that, although we were careful to match the percentages of individuals and situations 
described in the evidence (e.g., 5% of zorbs vs. 5% of situations involving Zorb), this is only a 
rough means of equating the actual strength of evidence. Recall that the individuals in the 
Individual-Traits condition were said to perform the relevant behaviors in a certain percentage of 
the situations where they had the opportunity to do so. Even within a relatively short time span, 
however, any individual has countless opportunities to perform any behavior imaginable. The 
vast majority of these behaviors are never actually performed; as a result, the base rate for any 
one of them is correspondingly low. In this context, even the lowest levels of evidence in our 
task may have constituted relatively strong evidence. For example, if an individual took 
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advantage of even 1% of the opportunities for a certain behavior (e.g., digging holes), that would 
still translate into quite a few instances of that behavior—perhaps sufficient to license a 
dispositional inference. The same may not be true when the evidence concerns the members of a 
kind. In this case, the base rates are more uncertain: Any particular feature could in principle be 
widespread among the members of any particular kind. Thus, low levels of evidence (e.g., 1%) 
seem less impressive than in the individual case. To summarize, potential differences in assumed 
base rates may have led to differences in the perceived strength of the evidence for individual-
trait and kind-feature inferences. In turn, it is possible that the differences we observed in 
people’s willingness to make kind-feature and individual-trait inferences are not due to 
differences in the underlying computational mechanisms but rather to differences in the strength 
of the evidence we provided as input to a single, shared mechanism. 
Overall, the present experiments provide promising evidence for the SIM Hypothesis. In 
the long run, however, it will be important to augment this evidence by testing other predictions 
of this hypothesis. For example, future studies could explore other possible characteristics of the 
shared inferential mechanism hypothesized here, beyond its sensitivity to threatening and 
distinctive stimuli. As we speculate in the next section, this mechanism may also be influenced 
by the explanations generated for the evidence at hand and may emerge early in development. If 
these are indeed characteristics of the shared inferential mechanism, then inferences about the 
features of kinds and the traits of individuals should exhibit them to the same extent. Further 
investigation of whether the mechanism responsible for these inferences is separate from the 
mechanisms responsible for other inductive inferences, including quantified inferences beyond 
those explored here, would also be worthwhile. 
How Does the Shared Inferential Mechanism Work? 
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 We have argued that people make inferences about the traits of individuals and the 
features of categories via the same cognitive mechanism. What are the characteristics of this 
mechanism? While a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
nevertheless provide a few speculative suggestions. The first two characteristics discussed below 
map directly onto the present experiments, while the last two go beyond them. 
First, it is likely that this mechanism privileges survival-relevant information, such that 
evidence pertaining to potential threats in the environment licenses stronger inferences about the 
relevant targets (individuals or kinds; see Experiment 1). These inferences have adaptive value 
insofar as they steer the organism away from future circumstances in which the relevant threats 
would reemerge (that is, away from future encounters with the individual or the members of the 
kind inferred to be a threat). Threat-relevant information is privileged in other cognitive–
perceptual systems as well, presumably because of its adaptive value (for reviews, see 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008). 
For example, even young children show faster orienting responses and enhanced memory for 
threatening stimuli (e.g., Baltazar, Shutts, & Kinzler, 2012; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010; 
Kinzler & Shutts, 2008; LoBue & DeLoache, 2010).  
 Second, the shared mechanism we hypothesize here is likely to attend to the 
diagnosticity, or informational value, of the evidence (see Experiment 3). A feature is diagnostic 
of a kind to the extent that it distinguishes that kind from others; analogously, a behavior is 
diagnostic of an individual to the extent that it distinguishes that individual from others. The role 
of diagnosticity has been independently recognized in the literatures on category and trait 
inferences, although it has not always been termed as such. The research on categories, for 
example, has identified distinctiveness as an important reason why people formulate and endorse 
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generic inferences such as lions have manes or cardinals are red (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010; 
Leslie, 2007, 2008). Although the features involved in these inferences are present only in a 
minority of kind members (e.g., only adult male lions have manes), they are nevertheless 
distinctive of these kinds (i.e., members of few other kinds have them). In turn, the 
distinctiveness (or diagnosticity) of these features boosts the acceptability of corresponding kind 
inferences relative to potential competitors (e.g., that cardinals are brown). The role of 
diagnosticity has been recognized in the literature on trait inferences as well. For example, in 
their groundbreaking treatise Jones and Davis (1965) argued it was a central determinant of 
whether a trait inference (or, in their terminology, a correspondent inference) is formulated: The 
likelihood of making a correspondent inference depends on the informational value provided by 
an action, which is trivially low if this action is unremarkable—that is, if this action is what 
anyone else would have done in the same context. For instance, to the extent that greeting one’s 
coworkers with a smile is simply what everyone does, then this behavior cannot serve as a basis 
for stronger inferences about a person’s general traits (e.g., friendliness). This argument about 
the role of diagnosticity or distinctiveness influenced subsequent work on this topic, much of 
which takes up the same conclusion in various forms (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975; Kelley, 
1967, 1973; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).7 In sum, it seems likely that 
the cognitive mechanism responsible for inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of 
individuals is sensitive to the diagnosticity of the evidence available.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Diagnosticity might explain the occasional positivity bias documented in inferences about the traits of individuals 
(as mentioned in the introduction). In certain domains (such as achievement), positive behaviors may be particularly 
diagnostic. Even the best artist, for example, does not create a masterpiece with every single work. Thus, in such a 
domain, a positive outcome (e.g., a masterpiece) may be more diagnostic than a negative one (e.g., a flop), and 
therefore more likely to lead to a trait inference (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). The same result would 
probably hold with respect to inferences about the features of kinds, although this prediction has not yet been tested 
(as far as we know). 
8 Many threatening features/behaviors are also distinctive. Might it be sufficient to posit that the hypothesized 
inferential mechanism is sensitive to diagnosticity, with threat being just a special case of diagnosticity? We suspect 
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 Third, inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals may be 
intimately linked with people’s explanations for the evidence at hand. A fundamental aspect of 
human psychology—acknowledged across various subdisciplines of psychological science—is 
the drive to make sense of the world via explanations (e.g., Cimpian & Salomon, in press; 
Gopnik, 1998; Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 2006; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Ross, 1977; Weiner, 
1985). The explanation generated for a certain observation imposes strong constraints on the 
breadth of the inferences that can be drawn from it. For example, if a feature of an unfamiliar 
animal (e.g., patches of hairless skin) is explained as an accident (e.g., the animal was in a fight), 
then it is unlikely that this feature will be inferred to characterize the animal’s kind (e.g., 
Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Gelman, 1988). Similarly, if an instance of behavior (e.g., a nervous 
laughter) is explained in terms of the particular circumstances in which the behavior occurred 
(e.g., a first date), then broader inferences about personal dispositions are unlikely. As with 
diagnosticity, the key role of explanation has been independently recognized by cognitive and 
social psychologists. A currently dominant view of categorization has in fact been termed the 
theory-based view so as to highlight the crucial role it assigns to causal-explanatory 
understandings in people’s reasoning about categories (e.g., Carey, 1985; Gelman, 2003; Murphy 
& Medin, 1985). Similarly, social psychologists have conceptualized the process of reasoning 
about individuals’ traits as an instance of causal attribution since their first systematic 
explorations of this subject matter (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). In sum, it seems 
plausible to claim that the mechanism by which inferences about the features of kinds and the 
traits of individuals are formulated is influenced by the explanations people generate to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that diagnosticity alone is not sufficient: The evidence in the broader literature suggests that the effects of negative 
or threatening stimuli emerge even when diagnosticity is taken into account (see Baumeister et al., 2001; Hitchcock 
& Knobe, 2009). Extrapolating from this evidence, we believe that these two dimensions are likely to exert (at least 
partly) independent effects on people’s kind-feature and individual-trait inferences. 
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sense of the world. 
 Finally, borrowing an idea from Leslie (2007, 2008) and Gelman (2010; Hollander, 
Gelman, & Star, 2002), we might also speculate that this shared mechanism is the default means 
available to our species for drawing general conclusions from limited evidence. By default, we 
mean two things here. First, this mechanism may be developmentally primitive—the first-
emerging and most basic means of going beyond the evidence to derive expectations about new 
exemplars or situations. Consistent with this possibility, inferences about both the features of 
kinds and the traits of individuals seem to be available to infants even before their first birthdays 
(e.g., Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 1993; Graham, Kilbreath, & Welder, 2004; Hamlin et al., 
2007; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Song, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2005; Woodward, 1998, 1999). 
There is also evidence that the ability to reason with these inferences precedes the ability to 
reason with quantified (e.g., existential, universal) inferences, which further strengthens claims 
of developmental primacy (Hollander et al., 2002; Mannheim, Gelman, Escalante, Huayhua, & 
Puma, 2011; Tardif, Gelman, Fu, & Zhu, 2012). It should be noted, however, that the latter 
studies pertain exclusively to inferences/generalizations over individuals (to either kinds or 
quantified sets). In future work, it will be important to test whether this conclusion also holds 
with respect to inductive inferences over situations.  
The shared inferential mechanism we hypothesize here may be default in a second sense 
as well: It may be the mechanism that people call upon spontaneously and without conscious 
awareness in order to routinely extract general conclusions from particular samples of evidence. 
The idea that dispositional inferences are computed ubiquitously, spontaneously, and outside of 
conscious awareness is commonly accepted in social psychology (for a review, see Uleman, 
Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Recent evidence suggests this conclusion extends to inferences 
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about the features of kinds as well. Sutherland, Cimpian, Leslie, and Gelman (under review) 
found that participants made kind inferences in a task in which such inferences detracted from 
correct performance (which speaks to their ubiquity and spontaneity), and even when 
participants were under a cognitive load. In fact, kind-feature and individual-trait inferences may 
be default in this second sense of “ubiquitously running in the background” in part because they 
require few cognitive resources to be computed (e.g.,  Hampton, 2012; Leslie & Gelman, 2012; 
Leslie, Khemlani, & Glucksberg, 2011; Todorov & Uleman, 2003).  
To summarize, we have argued that inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of 
individuals are computed via a shared mechanism that (1) is particularly sensitive to threat-
relevant information, (2) takes into account the diagnosticity of the evidence available, (3) is 
bound up with our intuitive explanations for how the evidence came about, and (4) may be the 
default generalization mechanism that humans possess. 
Conclusion 
The present experiments provide support for the SIM Hypothesis, according to which 
inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals are computed via the same 
cognitive mechanism. Looking to the future, our argument opens up opportunities for cross-
fertilization between two literatures that have long and rich traditions but that have seldom been 
in contact. If inferences about the features of kinds and the traits of individuals truly stem from 
the same source, as we have argued, then combining the insights accumulated independently by 
cognitive and social psychologists could be used to break tremendous new ground in 
understanding this important aspect of human reasoning. We hope that the present work will 
embolden researchers in both areas to investigate kind-feature and individual-trait inferences 
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jointly, in closely matched experimental designs, further exploring the many predictions that 
follow from the Shared Inferential Mechanism Hypothesis.    
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Sample item from Experiment 1 
Property 
Content 
Condition 
Kind-Features Individual-Traits 
   
Dangerous  Background information:  
One animal is called morseths. 
They live up to 50 years.a 
Background information:  
One animal is called Morseth. He is 
50 years old.a 
 
Evidence:  
x% of morseths chop off people's 
heads. 
 
Evidence:  
Morseth has chopped off people's 
heads in x% of the situations where 
he had the opportunity. 
 
Conclusion:  
Morseths chop off people's 
heads.  
 
Conclusion:  
Morseth chops off people's heads. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
Plain  Background information:  
One animal is called zorbs. They 
live up to 50 years.a 
Background information:  
One animal is called Zorb. He is 50 
years old.a  
Evidence:  
x% of zorbs climb trees. 
 
Evidence:  
Zorb has climbed trees in x% of the 
situations where he had the 
opportunity.  
 
Conclusion:  
Zorbs climb trees.  
 
Conclusion:  
Zorb climbs trees. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
a This second sentence served to disambiguate the referent of “one animal” in the preceding 
sentence (and of “some animals” in the instructions to participants, which were the same across 
conditions). “They live up to 50 years” signaled that the item is about a kind, whereas “He is 50 
years old” signaled that the item is about a specific individual. These sentences were the same 
across the 24 trials in a condition. 
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Table 2. Sample item from Experiment 2 
Property 
Content 
Condition 
Quantified Inferences  
over Individuals 
Quantified Inferences  
over Situations 
   
Dangerous  Background information:  
One animal is called morseths. 
They live up to 50 years. 
Background information:  
One animal is called Morseth. He is 50 
years old. 
 
Evidence:  
x% of morseths chop off people's 
heads. 
 
Evidence:  
Morseth chopped off people's heads in 
x% of the situations where he had the 
opportunity. 
 
Conclusion:  
[Some/All]a morseths chop off 
people's heads. 
Conclusion:  
Morseth [sometimes/always]a chops off 
people's heads. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
Plain  Background information:  
One animal is called zorbs. They 
live up to 50 years. 
Background information:  
One animal is called Zorb. He is 50 
years old.  
Evidence:  
x% of zorbs climb trees. 
 
Evidence:  
Zorb climbed trees in x% of the 
situations where he had the 
opportunity. 
Conclusion:  
[Some/All]a zorbs climb trees. 
Conclusion:  
Zorb [sometimes/always]a climbs trees. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
a “Some” and “sometimes” express existentially-quantified inferences. “All” and “always” 
express universally-quantified inferences. 
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Table 3. Sample item from Experiment 3 
Property 
Content 
Condition 
Kind-Features Individual-Traits 
   
Distinctive Background information:  
One animal is called morseths. 
They live up to 50 years. 
Background information:  
One animal is called Morseth. He is 50 
years old. 
Evidence:  
(1) x% of morseths climb trees.  
(2) On this planet, very few other 
animals perform this behavior. 
This behavior is extraordinary.  
Evidence:  
(1) Morseth has climbed trees in x% of 
the situations where he had the 
opportunity. 
(2) On this planet, very few other animals 
have ever performed this behavior when 
they had the opportunity. This behavior is 
extraordinary. 
Conclusion:  
Morseths climb trees. 
Conclusion:  
Morseth climbs trees. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
Plain Background information: 
One animal is called zorbs. They 
live up to 50 years. 
Background information: 
One animal is called Zorb. He is 50 years 
old. 
Evidence:  
(1) x% of zorbs wash themselves 
with water.  
(2) On this planet, many other 
animals also perform this 
behavior. This behavior is 
unremarkable.  
Evidence: 
(1) Zorb has washed himself with water in 
x% of the situations where he had the 
opportunity. 
(2) On this planet, many other animals 
have also performed this behavior when 
they had the opportunity. This behavior is 
unremarkable. 
Conclusion:  
Zorbs wash themselves with 
water.  
Conclusion:  
Zorb washes himself with water. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
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Table 4. Sample item from Experiment 4 
Property 
Content 
Condition 
Quantified Inferences  
over Individuals 
Quantified Inferences  
over Situations 
   
Distinctive Background information:  
One animal is called morseths. 
They live up to 50 years. 
Background information:  
One animal is called Morseth. He is 50 
years old. 
Evidence:  
(1) x% of morseths climb trees.  
(2) On this planet, very few other 
animals perform this behavior. 
This behavior is extraordinary.  
Evidence:  
(1) Morseth has climbed trees in x% of the 
situations where he had the opportunity. 
(2) On this planet, very few other animals 
have ever performed this behavior when 
they had the opportunity. This behavior is 
extraordinary. 
Conclusion: 
[Some/All]a morseths climb trees. 
Conclusion: 
Morseth [sometimes/always]a climbs trees. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
Plain Background information: 
One animal is called zorbs. They 
live up to 50 years. 
Background information: 
One animal is called Zorb. He is 50 years 
old. 
Evidence:  
(1) x% of zorbs wash themselves 
with water.  
(2) On this planet, many other 
animals also perform this 
behavior. This behavior is 
unremarkable.  
Evidence: 
(1) Zorb has washed himself with water in 
x% of the situations where he had the 
opportunity. 
(2) On this planet, many other animals have 
also performed this behavior when they had 
the opportunity. This behavior is 
unremarkable. 
Conclusion:  
[Some/All]a zorbs wash 
themselves with water.  
Conclusion:  
Zorb [sometimes/always]a washes himself 
with water. 
Is this conclusion true or false? Is this conclusion true or false? 
a “Some” and “sometimes” express existentially-quantified inferences. “All” and “always” 
express universally-quantified inferences.  
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Figure 1. Average proportion of “true” responses in Experiment 1,  
by inference type, property content, and level of evidence. 
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Figure 2. Average proportion of “true” responses in Experiment 2,  
by quantifier, property content, and level of evidence. 
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Figure 3. Average proportion of “true” responses in Experiment 3,  
by inference type, property content, and level of evidence. 
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Figure 4. Average proportion of “true” responses in Experiment 4,  
by quantifier, property content, and level of evidence. 
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